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Einstein initially objected to the probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics—
the idea that God is playing at dice. Later he changed his ground, and focussed
instead on the point that the Copenhagen Interpretation leads to what Einstein
saw as the abandonment of physical realism. We argue here that Einstein’s ini-
tial intuition was perfectly sound, and that it is precisely the fact that quantum
mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory which is at the root of all the
controversies regarding its interpretation. Probability is an intrinsically logical
concept. This means that the quantum state has an essentially logical signif-
icance. It is extremely difficult to reconcile that fact with Einstein’s belief,
that it is the task of physics to give us a vision of the world apprehended sub
specie aeternitatis. Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a simple choice:
either to follow Einstein in looking for a theory which is not probabilistic at
the fundamental level, or else to accept that physics does not in fact put us in
the position of God looking down on things from above. There is a widespread
fear that the latter alternative must inevitably lead to a greatly impoverished,
positivistic view of physical theory. It appears to us, however, that the truth
is just the opposite. The Einsteinian vision is much less attractive than it
seems at first sight. In particular, it is closely connected with philosophical
reductionism.
1For a long time Einstein strongly objected to the indeterminism of quantum
mechanics. As he put it in a letter to Born (written in 1926, in response to Born’s
proposal that the wave-function has an essentially probabilistic significance):
Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells
me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does
not really bring us any closer to the secret of the ‘old one’. I, at any
rate, am convinced that He is not playing at dice. [Born-Einstein
letters [1], p. 91]
I think people often find it difficult to understand why Einstein was so emphatic in
his rejection of a dice-playing God. Quantum mechanics presents many obstacles
to the understanding. But the concept of an objective chance appears, on the face
of it, intuitively very natural. At least as judged by the standards of commonsense,
if anything is paradoxical, it is the rigid determinism of classical physics, with its
apparent denial of human freedom. It seems that Einstein came to feel this himself
in the end. One finds him expressing strong objections to the notion of a dice-
playing God as late as 1944 (ref. [1], p.149). However in 1954 Pauli reports him as
“disput[ing] that he uses as criterion for the admissibility of a theory the question
‘Is it rigorously deterministic?’ ”(ref. [1], p.221).
It seems to me, however, that Einstein gave in too easily. It is precisely the fact
that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory which is at the
root of all the controversies regarding its interpretation. Specifically, it is the fact
that the wavefunction has a fundamentally probabilistic significance which means
that the wavefunction has to collapse consequent on a measurement; and it is that
collapse which makes it hard to interpret the quantum state in the way that so
many people would like to interpret it, as a physically real entity.
To illustrate the point consider a case where someone—for the sake of definiteness
let us call her Alice—has bought a lottery ticket. Suppose that the draw has
taken place, and that Alice’s ticket won. However, Alice does not know this. So,
even though the reality is that Alice did win the lottery, she herself thinks that
the probability of her having won is very small. Now suppose that Alice opens
a newspaper, and is surprised to discover that hers is the winning ticket. Then
her state of mind will suddenly change, from believing that the probability of her
having won is close to zero, to believing that it is close to one (not quite one
because the newspaper might have misprinted the winning number). There is, of
course, nothing mysterious about this change in Alice’s state of mind. Changing a
probability assignment consequent on the acquisition of new information is a very
natural and reasonable thing to do.
Now compare this with a quantum mechanical measurement. Before the mea-
surement one integrates the squared modulus of the electron’s wave function and
finds that the probability of the electron having x coordinate in the range 1 < x < 2
is 10−7. But then one performs the measurement and finds that the x coordinate
actually is in the range which one previously considered to be highly improbable.
So, just as in the lottery example considered in the last paragraph, one changes
one’s assessment of the probability of the electron’s x coordinate being in the range
1 < x < 2 from 10−7 to a value close to 1. Since the probability is directly related
to the wavefunction this means one must also make an equally sudden and dramatic
change to the electron’s wavefunction. That change is just the notorious collapse
of the wavefunction, which I think it is probably fair to say has been the cause of
more philosophical agonising than any other phenomenon in the history of physics.
The question is: why should the discontinuous change in the electron’s wave
function be considered any more puzzling than the no less radical change in Alice’s
assessment of the likelihood of her having won the lottery? The short answer to
2this question is that there is no temptation to regard the change in Alice’s beliefs
as anything more than a change in Alice’s state of mind. On the other hand there
is a very strong temptation to regard the electron’s wavefunction as a physically
real entity. Consequently, there is a strong temptation to think that if the elec-
tron’s wave function were to change, merely as a consequence of the experimenter
acquiring new information, it would mean that reality itself had changed, merely
as a consequence of the experimenter acquiring new information. However physi-
cists are, on the whole, reluctant to believe in spiritual phenomena. So the usual
response is to try to twist the interpretation of quantum mechanics in such a way
as to make it seem, either that the wavefunction does not really collapse (as in,
for example, the Bohm or Everett interpretations), or else that it does collapse
but not as a consequence of the change in the experimenter’s state of mind (as in
spontaneous collapse theories).
At this point it will be convenient to introduce a piece of terminology. I will say
that a probability is epistemic if it is conceived in the same way that one naturally
conceives the probability of Alice having won the lottery, as representing, not a
piece of mind-independent physical reality, but only a cognitive agent’s expectations
regarding that reality. Phrased in these terms the short answer to the question
posed at the beginning of the last paragraph reads: the discontinuous change in
the probability of the electron being located in a particular region tends to be seen
as problematic because there is a strong temptation to see the probability as, not
merely epistemic, but objectively real.
However, the short answer is not completely satisfactory because it fails to make
clear why it is only with the development of quantum mechanics that one finds this
strong, almost overwhelming temptation to regard probabilities as objectively real
entities. After all, probability played a major role in the physics of the nineteenth
century. Maxwell, in particular, was very clear that probabilities are to be conceived
as logical constructs, rather than objective realities:
They say that Understanding ought to work by the rules of right
reason. These rules are, or ought to be, contained in Logic; but the
actual science of Logic is conversant at present only with things
either certain, impossible, or entirely doubtful, none of which (for-
tunately) we have to reason on. Therefore the true logic for this
world is the calculus of probabilities, which takes account of the
magnitude of the probability which is, or ought to be, in a reason-
able man’s mind. [quoted Jeffreys [2], p.1]
This prompts the question: if Maxwell, who was one of those chiefly responsible
for the classical theory of statistical mechanics, could cheerfully accept that the
probability of a molecule being in a particular region is to be conceived in purely
epistemic terms, why is it that his 20th and 21st century successors are so wedded
to the opposite, objectivist point of view? Actually, it is worth noting that Ein-
stein himself was happy enough with probabilities conceived in these Maxwellian,
epistemic terms. Indeed, some of Einstein’s most important contributions to the-
oretical physics relied on a masterly deployment of probabilistic ideas. It seems
that Einstein was perfectly willing to play dice himself. His objection was only
to the idea that God might be playing them too. The question is: why? Why
should behaviour which is acceptable in Einstein suddenly become unacceptable
when imputed to God?
I think the answer to that question must be that the theories of classical physics
were not fundamentally probabilistic theories. To be sure, the classical physicists
found themselves compelled to use probabilistic reasoning. However, probabilis-
tic concepts were not embedded in their theories at the most fundamental level.
3Maxwell could easily accept that the probability distributions with which he worked
were not to be conceived as objective realities because there were numerous other
quantities in the theories of classical physics which could be regarded as directly
corresponding to physical realities. The problem his 20th and 21st successors face
is that quantum mechanics, by contrast, is probabilistic at the fundamental level.
In quantum mechanics the only obvious candidate for a mind-independent physical
reality is the wave function. So if one takes an epistemic view of the wave function
one seems to be driven into the position that nothing at all in the theory corre-
sponds to a mind-independent physical reality. It seems as though one is in danger
of losing one’s grip on physical reality altogether. And that, I think, is what leads to
all the attempts (the Bohm interpretation, the Everett interpretation, spontaneous
collapse theories, etc.) to interpret the quantum state as an objectively existent
physical entity.
However, I think it is fair to say that these attempts are all highly speculative.
Each such approach has its associated group of enthusiasts. However, the enthu-
siasts for one approach are unable to find arguments sufficient to persuade, either
the enthusiasts for any of the others, or the much larger group of the conceptually
uncommitted. At least at present the decision to opt for (say) the Bohm inter-
pretation, rather than (say) the Everettian, seems to rest on nothing more than
personal taste. That situation might conceivably change. If, for example, Valen-
tini’s hopes [3, 4] were fulfilled we would have solid empirical reasons for preferring
one objectivist interpretation over another. But in the present state of knowledge
it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the question is empirically undecidable.
Of course, “empirically undecidable” does not mean “necessarily false”. Perhaps
the world is in reality Bohmian. There is certainly nothing we know to exclude
that hypothesis. The trouble is that there seems to be nothing to support it either.
Not only are there no observations which would clinch the question. There does
not even seem to be any moderately persuasive reason for thinking the hypothesis
likely.
I intend no disrespect to the proponents of the various objectivist interpretations
by these remarks. On the contrary it appears to me that Bohm, Everett and others
have made very important contributions to our understanding of these questions.
Quantum mechanics is a deeply puzzling subject, and I think that if one wants to
understand it better one needs to look at it from every possible angle. So I would
certainly not dispute the value of the work done by Bohm, Everett and others.
However, the fact is that science is concerned specifically with those questions where
it is possible to find clearly stateable, cogent reasons for belief or unbelief. Until
such reasons are forthcoming I do not see how any of the objectivist interpreations
can be considered a satisfactory solution to the problem. At the least I think it
must be worth exploring alternative, non-objectivist ways of thinking about the
quantum state.
It is a striking fact that, although different people take very different views as
to what the quantum state may be in ultimate reality, when it comes to the prob-
lem of making experimental predictions everyone calculates in exactly the same
way. In particular, everyone collapses the wave function (proponents of the Everett
interpretation believe that there is a state vector of the universe which does not
collapse; however, the wave function that an Everettian writes down on paper, for
the purposes of making an experimental prediction, collapses in just the same way
as the one that a Copenhagenist writes down). At least so far as the empirical pre-
dictions are concerned the significance of the quantum state begins and ends with
the fact that it specifies a set of probabilities. Of course, this does not logically
4exclude the hypothesis that the quantum state has some other significance in ulti-
mate reality. However, in the absence of any compelling evidence as to what that
significance might be, it seems to me that the most natural and straightforward
course is to adopt the hypothesis that the quantum state simply is a compendium
of probablities, and to see what follows from that.
If that is accepted the next question we have to address is, how to interpret a
probability statement. Here we run into the difficulty that the theory of probability
is troubled by a controversy which is even more long-standing than the 80-year old
controversy about the interpretation of the wave function. At the beginning of the
last century Poincare´ [5] (p.186) described probability as an “obscure instinct”. In
the 100 years that have elapsed since then there has been much discussion. How-
ever, the effect has, if anything, only been to intensify the disagreements. Broadly
speaking there are two schools of thought. On the one hand there is the objectivist
school of thought (represented by, for example, von Mises [6, 7], Fisher [8] and Pop-
per [9, 10]) which holds that a classical probability distribution should be regarded
as an objectively real physical entity, which is what it is independently of anything
that we might know or think about it. On the other hand there is the epistemic
school of thought (represented by, for example, Laplace [11], de Finetti [12], Jef-
freys [2], Savage [13] and Jaynes [14, 15]) which holds that a probability distribution
has an essentially logical significance. For a broad overview of the questions at issue
see, for example, Gillies [16] and Howson and Urbach [17]. For the connection to
quantum mechanics see Jaynes [14, 15], Fuchs [18, 19], Caves et al [20, 21] and
Appleby [22, 23].
Now one might say that philosophy would no longer be philosophy if people
ever came to agree about something. However, this particular dispute is unlike
many other conceptual disputes in that it has some immediate, and very important
practical consequences. For, associated with the two different schools of thought
about the content of probability statements, there are two very different statistical
methodologies. The objectivist view—the desire to interpret probabilities as mind-
independent physical entities which can be measured rather in the way that a
mass can be measured—motivated Fisher and others to develop what is now the
orthodox statistical methodology, described in every textbook. By contrast the
epistemic point of view is associated with the statistical methodology originally
proposed by Bayes, and greatly extended by Laplace. These different statistical
methodologies will, in general, lead to different practical conclusions.
The complaint of the Bayesians about the orthodox statistical methodology has
always been that it is (in the words of de Finetti [12], p.245) “ad hoc” and “arbi-
trary”. Jeffreys makes the point with characteristic irony when he says of Fisher
(one of the founding fathers of the orthodox methodology)
I have in fact been struck repeatedly in my own work, after being
led on general principles to the solution of a problem, to find that
Fisher had already grasped the essentials by some brilliant piece
of common sense [Jeffreys [2], p. 393]
This is, in a way, a compliment. However, the compliment is distinctly back-handed:
for what Jeffreys is really saying is that Fisher, notwithstanding his confusions and
inconsistencies, often contrives to get the right answer owing to the power of his
intuition. It is rather as if a physicist were to congratulate a snooker player on
his ability to pot a ball notwithstanding his ignorance of Newtonian mechanics; or
to congratulate a fish on its ability to swim notwithstanding its ignorance of the
principles of hydrodynamics. I have argued elsewhere [22, 23] that that criticism
is amply justified. Generally speaking what drives the Bayesian school of thought
is a desire for clarity and logical cogency. By contrast the orthodox statistical
5methodology is driven by what Jaynes describes as an ideological conviction that,
if statistics is to be scientific, then probability distributions must be conceived as
objectively real entities. To attain that ideological end orthodox statisticians are
willing to make whatever sacrifice of logical coherence seems necessary.
The problem orthodox statisticians face is that, however sophisticated the tech-
nical superstructure may become, what is at the bottom of the pyramid is the
ordinary primitive intuition of one event being more or less probable than another.
Furthermore every statistical argument has to rely on that intuition if it is to make
contact with reality. One may cover hundreds of pages with intricate calculations.
But the question one is ultimately asking, and must answer if there is to be any
point to the calculations, is always very simple. It is a question of the form: how
probable is it that X? Would it be wise to bet on X? And however words may be
used by professional statisticians in their private reasoning processes, the sense of
the word “probable” as it is used in the statement of the final conclusion is always
the primitive sense, which a child of 7, who knows nothing of the formal appara-
tus of probability theory, can comprehend. In particular it is a sense of the word
“probable” which applies to single cases. If I want to know whether a drug is more
likely to cure me than to kill me then, although I might make use of data regarding
the fate of other patients, the question I want to answer is a single-case question:
what will probably happen to me if I take the drug? Shall I gamble with my life?
(not the lives of a statistical ensemble, but my singular, personal life).
Of course the primitive notion of probability, that a child of 7 can understand, is
non-quantitative. It cannot be embedded in a formal mathematical theory without
a very considerable degree of theoretical elaboration. The relation between the
primitive notion of probability and the formal mathematical one is, in some ways,
similar to the relation between the common sense notions of mass and force, and
the concepts going by the same names which feature in Newtonian mechanics. So
I am certainly not meaning to identify the primitive, common sense notion with
the formal mathematical concept of probability. But what I think is undeniably
the case is that the formal concept is a development of the primitive one (a very
considerable development, no doubt, but a development nonetheless). Furthermore,
the formal concept depends on the primitive notion for its empirical applicability.
If the formal concept is developed to the point where it loses all connection with
the primitive notion, then the theory will lose all its practical utility.
The problem this poses for orthodox statisticians (the insuperable problem, as it
seems to me) is that the primitive notion of probability is, obviously and unavoid-
ably, epistemic in its character. Consider the example I discussed earlier, where as
it happens Alice’s lottery ticket won, but she does not know it. In those circum-
stances Alice believes that it is most unlikely that she won. Most people would
consider she was right to think it most unlikely. And yet the fact of the matter is
that she did win. It can be seen that we have here two statements having radically
different logical characters. On the one hand there is the epistemic statement:
Alice is most unlikely to have won the lottery
On the other hand there is the factual statement (which, although Alice does not
know it, describes the actual state of affairs)
Alice did win the lottery
The second statement is a proposition about the lottery draw, as it exists indepen-
dently of what Alice knows or does not know. The first statement, by contrast,
is as much about Alice, and her limited information, as it is about the lottery.
Specifically, it is a logically evaluative statement about what Alice, in her epistemic
situation, can reasonably expect. This epistemic character becomes apparent when
one considers what happens when Alice opens the newspaper and discovers that her
6ticket did win. In that case her belief state changes discontinuously. Rather in the
way that the wave function changes discontinuously consequent on a measurement,
Alice switches from thinking that she almost certainly did not win the lottery to
thinking that she almost certainly did win (not quite certainly because, for example,
the newspaper might have misprinted the winning number or, for example, because
she might be hallucinating). There is nothing mysterious, or philosophically offen-
sive about this discontinuous change. It simply reflects the fact that the statement
was epistemic, and epistemic statements naturally are subject to revision, conse-
quent on the acquisition of new information. It is also worth noting that Alice’s
discovery, that her ticket did win, will not lead her to think that she was wrong to
believe that she probably had not won. On the contrary, she will continue to think
that she was right to believe that she probably had not won. Naturally so: for the
belief that she probably had not won did not represent a mistaken belief about the
physical world. Rather it represented a logically evaluative belief about what she,
in her previous epistemic situation, could reasonably expect.
If this is accepted, and if the point I made earlier (that the mathematical theory
of probability relies on the primitive notion of probability to make contact with
reality) is also accepted, then it follows that the project of the orthodox statisticians
(to construct a completely objective theory of statistical inference) is likely to run
into insuperable obstacles. I believe that a more detailed examination [2, 12, 14,
15, 22, 23] of the question confirms that proposition. As a result the orthodox
statisticians are rather in the position that one would be in if one insisted on trying
to construct a theory of sound based on the assumption that sound is a form of
electromagnetic radiation; or a theory of number based on the assumption that a
number is, not an abstract logical entity, but a concrete physical object. It is only
possible to produce a simulacrum of success by bending the facts and twisting the
logic.
I believe that similar considerations apply to the quantum state. Quantum
mechanics is deeply and intriguingly different from classical probability theory. It
is also much farther removed from common sense ways of thinking. Nevertheless
it has certain basic features in common. In particular quantum probabilities, like
classical probabilities, are unavoidably epistemic in character: as is clearly signalled
by the discontinuous change in the quantum state which occurs consequent on a
measurement outcome.
This brings us back to the problem which troubled Einstein. It is easy to take an
epistemic view of the probabilities in classical statistical mechanics because classical
statistical mechanics presents us with various other mathematical constructs which
can be thought of as the depictions of actually existent physical entities. But the
same is not true of quantum mechanics. Consequently, it may seem that taking
an epistemic view of the quantum state amounts to giving up on the project of
understanding physical reality altogether. It may look, on the face of it, as though
quantum mechanics thus interpreted leads, if not to idealism, or to pure solipsism,
then at any rate to a depressingly positivistic view in which physics begins and ends
with the task of predicting detector “clicks”. I believe it is that perception which
motivated Einstein’s search for a more complete description, and which continues
to motivate the various objectivist interpretations of the quantum state.
In response to that objection let me begin by saying that it is, to my mind, a
very reasonable objection. Indeed, for most of my research career my sympathies
have been with the opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation. To a considerable
extent they still are. Bell complains that the Copenhagen interpretation is “unpro-
fessionally vague and ambiguous” and that quantum mechanics, when interpreted
7in Copenhagen terms, seems to be “exclusively concerned with ‘results of measure-
ment’ and [seems to have] nothing to say about anything else” (Bell [24], pp. 173
and 117). I think he is right on both counts. I share Bell’s conviction that the aim
of physics is to understand nature, and that counting detector “clicks” is not in-
trinsically any more interesting than counting beans. The day I become convinced
that physics does not in fact provide us with anything more than procedures for
predicting detector “clicks” will be the day I abandon physics in favour of some
more stimulating activity. Nevertheless I have gradually come to feel that the most
promising way forward lies, not in the Copenhagen Interpretation as such, but in
a greatly improved version of it to which Bell’s criticisms would not apply. If I am
asked to accept Bohr as the authoritative voice of final truth then I cannot assent.
But if his writings are approached in a more flexible spirit, as a source of insights
which are but dimly apprehended, then they suggest a line of thought which I feel
might, if further developed, be very fruitful.
Taking this view does not amount to the abandonment of physical realism. If
anything it is exactly the other way round. The various objectivist interpretations
(Bohm, Everett, . . . ) do indeed provide us with numerous beguiling images of
how things might, conceivably stand in ultimate reality. The trouble is that there
does not seem to be any way to decide which, if any of these alternative pictures
corresponds to the truth. As I stated earlier this situation could change. If, for
example, Valentini’s hopes [3, 4] were fulfilled we might have solid empirical grounds
for regarding the quantum state as a physically real entity. But in the present
state of our knowledge objectivist interpretations of the quantum state are purely
speculative. It is, of course, true that every well-attested scientific theory started
out as a piece of speculation. However, although speculation undoubtedly has its
place in science, I think there is something very discouraging about a theory which,
one may reasonably fear, is never going to get beyond the level of pure speculation.
The aim of science is, after all, not merely to speculate, but to make empirically
well-grounded statements about physical reality. It is not inconceivable that one
or other of the objectivist approaches will eventually be pushed to the point where
it meets that requirement. However, my own feeling is that a more promising
approach is to try to make better sense of the wave function when it is conceived
epistemically. Whether that judgment is correct only time will tell. But what is
certain is that the motive is to better understand what quantum mechanics is telling
us about the world.
It is, however, true that, although the epistemic approach does not lead to the
abandonment of physical realism, it forces us to think of physical reality in a very
different way from the one to which we have become classically accustomed. For
200 years after the time of Newton physics was inspired by the dream of construct-
ing a perfectly faithful depiction of the world. A map, each point of which is in
one-one correspondence with an element of physical reality. A map, furthermore,
which leaves nothing out—a map in which every feature of physical reality has its
representative, and in which it never happens that a simple feature of the map
corresponds to a complex feature of the actual world. When Einstein talks of God
I believe it is this that he has in mind: a vision of the world apprehended sub specie
aeternitatis, as God might see it looking down on things from above. I think it
must be true that the epistemic interpretation requires us to give up on that. And I
think it must also be true that that to anyone of Einstein’s philosophical persuasion
that is going to feel like a major sacrifice. However, I would suggest that if one
takes the trouble to think through the implications carefully one may start to feel
that the sacrifice is not so great as it initially looks. In fact one may even begin to
feel that it is not a sacrifice at all, but a liberation.
8The epistemic interpretation requires us to abandon the idea that a cat’s wave
function is in one-one correspondence with the cat’s ultimate reality. But that
does not mean it requires us to give up the idea that quantum mechanics tells
us something important about the cat. Quite the contrary. Quantum mechan-
ics makes a large number of remarkably detailed statements about, for example,
the cat’s molecular biology. The epistemic interpretation leaves all of those state-
ments completely intact. The statements are, to be sure, only probabilistic. In
other words they are statements about what we, with our limited information, can
reasonably expect. However, I would question whether that acknowledgment rep-
resents the major intellectual defeat that Einstein would take it to be. It is not,
after all, as though there has ever really been any question of apprehending the
world sub specie aeternitatis. God may know, with absolute certainty, the position
of a classical particle. But we never have. It is a truism that science does not
give us complete certainty. The propositions of science are and always have been,
without exception, statements that something is more or less probable. Quantum
mechanics, interpreted epistemically, changes nothing in that respect.
If Einstein’s hopes had been fulfilled we would be in the ostensibly happy position
of seeing right through to the cat’s metaphysical bottom. At any rate, we would
be able to imagine that we had achieved that feat. By contrast, the epistemic
interpretation obliges us to concede to the cat a degree of metaphysical privacy.
Is that such a bad thing? Einstein’s vision, of the world apprehended sub specie
aeternitatis, is closely connected with philosophical reductionism. And, however it
may be with cats, the idea that a human being simply reduces to a configuration of
classical fields (or whatever) is not very plausible. A large part of the philosophy
of the mind consists of various rather unconvincing attempts to understand how
the brain, conceived in reductionist terms, can give rise to consciousness. One of
the reasons I am interested in the epistemic point of view is that I feel that when
properly developed it may lead to a much more satisfactory, non-reductionist way
of thinking about the mind-brain relationship.
The ambition to “know the mind of God” is not realistic. But I would go further
than that. I would question whether the idea is even attractive. Suppose one really
could comprehend the universe in its entirety. Might this not be found a little
cramping? If the universe really could be comprehended in its entirety it would
mean that the universe was as limited as we are. It seems to me that living in such
a universe would be rather like trying to swim in water that is only six inches deep.
Groucho Marx once said that he would not want to belong to a club that would
have him as a member. In a similar vein, my personal feeling is that I would not
wish to belong to a universe that I was able to fully comprehend.
Against this vision, of physics as knowing the mind of God, I would like to
set another: physics as swimming in water that is a great deal deeper than we
are—perhaps even infinitely deep.
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